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INTRODUCTION
A common criticism of Federal patent litigation1 is that patent suits are
tried before lay jurors who are ill-suited to understand the complex
technologies that many patent suits entail. Like other juries, patent juries
are currently drawn from the general population. Yet many patent suits
involve cutting-edge technologies — in such areas as computer science,
electrical engineering, and the life sciences — that are very difficult to
explain to the average American, who lacks experience in those fields.
Moreover, patents themselves are written for a person “of skill in the art,”
which is a hypothetical person who has a significant level of skill and
experience in the patent’s technological field. Lay jurors are unlikely to be
persons of skill in the art, and they may find it utterly impossible to put
themselves in such a person’s shoes. The result is that patent suits are tried
before jurors who often have little ability to even understand the patent and
the accused product themselves, let alone the ability to accurately compare
the accused product to the patent claims in order to determine infringement.
Faced with these difficulties, several commentators have suggested
that patent cases be tried before specialized juries comprised of individuals
who have some level of expertise in the field of the patent.2 At the same
time, these commentators have expressed skepticism about whether it
would be feasible to impanel such specialized juries. As one commentator
stated, “it may be practically impossible to gather a jury of twelve experts
Similarly, another
for each complex, and often lengthy, trial.”3
commentator has acknowledged “the potential difficulty of finding highly
educated specialists who would not suffer undue hardship from being
compelled to sit through a lengthy patent litigation.”4 Indeed, “[m]ost of
1. Patent lawsuits are litigated solely in the Federal courts. State courts have no
jurisdiction to hear such lawsuits. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012).
2. See, e.g., Michael A. Fisher, Going for the Blue Ribbon, 2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 1, 3 (2001) (considering whether litigants have the right to a jury equipped to
understand the dispute, and exploring practical ways of selecting expert jurors); Gregory D.
Leibold, In Juries We Do Not Trust: Appellate Review of Patent-Infringement Litigation, 67
U. COLO. L. REV. 623, 648-53 (1996) (discussing the legal and practical problems inherent
in using expert juries); Beth Z. Shaw, Judging Juries: Evaluating Renewed Proposals for
Specialized Juries from A Public Choice Perspective, 2006 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 3, 6 (2006)
(suggesting that specialized juries can improve the group deliberation process in patent
cases); D. Alan White, The Doctrine of Equivalents: Fairness and Uncertainty in an Era of
Biologic Pharmaceuticals, 60 EMORY L.J. 751, 787 (2011) (exploring the historical roots of
expert juries and why they could be used in challenging cases).
3. Leibold, supra note 2, at 650.
4. Fisher, supra note 2, at 78; accord Gregory J. Wallace, Toward Certainty and
Uniformity in Patent Infringement Cases After Festo and Markman: A Proposal for A
Specialized Patent Trial Court with A Rule of Greater Deference, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1383,
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the current proposals acknowledge the potential difficulties in selection and
retention of specialized juries . . . .”5
This Article seeks to address such skepticism by giving a concrete
proposal for how to impanel specialized juries for patent cases, and by
providing empirical survey data suggesting that this proposal would be
feasible. Specifically, this Article proposes that the Federal government
offer one-year jury commissions to technically skilled individuals for an
annual salary of roughly $100,000. Qualified individuals would have at
least a bachelor’s degree in a scientific or technical field, and would be
assigned to hear patent cases that fall within their area of technical
expertise for the duration of their one-year term of service. The cost of
their salaries would be offset by surcharges on patent litigants, leaving the
system revenue-neutral from the government’s perspective. Assuming that
a specialized juror could hear roughly 18 cases during a one-year term of
service, and assuming a panel of nine jurors to hear each case, each patent
litigant would need to pay only $25,000 per lawsuit to fully offset the
salaries of the specialized jurors. Given that patent cases typically cost
millions of dollars to litigate through to verdict, these $25,000 surcharges
would be comparatively modest, and would seem a small price to pay for
the benefit of having one’s case heard before skilled jurors who are likely
to understand the technical issues in the case. Furthermore, such
specialized juries would allow patent trials to be streamlined and shortened,
thus bringing cost savings to litigants that would largely or entirely offset
the cost of the surcharges.
To gauge whether technically skilled individuals would be willing to
serve a one-year term as a specialized patent juror, I surveyed 389
undergraduate and graduate students at sixteen U.S. colleges and
universities.6 Each student was either majoring in or pursuing graduate
work in one of the two broad fields that spawn much complex patent
litigation: (1) computer science and electrical engineering, or (2) the life
sciences.7 The survey results were encouraging: out of the 389 total survey
1409 (2004) (“Another solution might be to require jurors to have a college degree or
expertise in an area that is relevant to the disputed patent. It might be impossible, however,
to obtain enough qualified jurors who meet such a requirement and who would not suffer
undue hardship from service on a jury throughout the course of a lengthy patent trial.”).
5. Shaw, supra note 2, at 6.
6. These colleges and universities are: Bates College, the University of CaliforniaBerkeley, Claremont McKenna College, Colorado College, the University of Florida,
Grinnell College, the University of Idaho, the University of Illinois, the University of
Massachusetts, the University of Mississippi, the University of North Dakota, Penn State
University, Stanford University, Trinity University (Texas), Wellesley College, and the
University of Wyoming. A full description of my survey methodology is provided at
Appendix A, and a sample survey form is provided at Appendix B.
7. From 1995-2014, five of the eight most common industries for patent litigation
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respondents, over 73% indicated that they would “seriously consider” a
one-year, post-graduation term of patent jury service for a salary of
$100,000 or less. The results were broadly consistent for undergraduate
versus graduate students, and for computer science or electrical engineering
students versus life science students. These data suggest that there is a
large pool of skilled individuals who would be willing to serve on the
specialized patent juries that this Article proposes. In other words, the data
suggest that this proposal is a feasible way to impanel specialized juries
that are competent to hear complex patent cases.
This Article proceeds in three main Parts. Part II discusses the
difficulties that lay juries have in adjudicating complex patent cases and
explains how specialized juries could greatly improve the adjudicatory
process. Part III discusses possible constitutional issues surrounding
specialized juries, but concludes that specialized juries would be consistent
with both the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial and the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of equal protection. Finally, Part IV outlines a
concrete proposal to staff patent cases with jurors who have a bachelor’s or
advanced degree in the field of the patent, and who would agree to serve a
one-year jury term in exchange for a salary of roughly $100,000. This final
Part also draws upon survey results to demonstrate the feasibility of this
proposal, and it provides suggestions for diversifying age and other
demographics of the proposed specialized patent juries.
I.

THE PROBLEMS WITH LAY PATENT JURIES — AND HOW
SPECIALIZED JURIES COULD ALLEVIATE THESE PROBLEMS

A. The Problems with Lay Patent Juries
It should come as no surprise that lay jurors often find it difficult to
decide patent suits, or even to understand the subject-matter of such suits.8
After all, patents may only be granted on “any new and useful process,
(Biotech/Pharma, Computer Hardware/Electronics, Medical Devices, Software, and
Telecommunications) were industries that rely heavily on computer science, electrical
engineering, and/or the life sciences. See Chris Barry et al., 2015 Patent Litigation Study,
10
(2015),
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensicPRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
services/publications/assets/2015-pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf
[https://perma.cc/86FFP6Q6] (providing a graph comparing the top ten industries involved in patent cases).
Moreover, the four industries that yielded the largest patent verdicts (Biotech/Pharma,
Telecommunications, Medical Devices, and Computer Hardware/Electronics) were all
industries that rely heavily on computer science, electrical engineering, and/or the life
sciences. Id. at 11.
8. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 1 (“As patented technologies have become increasingly
complex, there has been growing concern that ordinary jurors lack the ability to understand
the scientific and technical issues in patent litigation.”).
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machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof.”9 By definition, therefore, patents are supposed to
cover new processes, machines, and compositions (i.e., advancements that
have never been known before). So, when patents seek to advance such
technical fields as biotechnology and computer science, the results can be
dauntingly complex. Consider, for example, the patent claims10 at issue in
just the first two decisions issued by the Federal Circuit11 in 2016. The
patent claim in the first decision, from the field of biotechnology, reads as
follows:
A method for making an enzymatic hydrolysate of a soy fiber
comprising:
(a) mixing water and a soy fiber to form a substantially
homogenous aqueous dispersion of hydrated unhydrolyzed
soy fiber, wherein the unhydrolyzed soy fiber and water are
present in a weight ratio of between about 1:1.5 and about
1:8;
(b) adjusting the pH of the mixture to between about 4.5 and
about 5.5;
(c) heating to at least about 200°F for a time sufficient to
substantially swell the unhydrolyzed soy fiber;
(d) cooling the mixture to between about 115°F and about
135°F;
(e) contacting the mixture with one or more endoglucanase
enzymes in the absence of exohydrolytic enzymes, said one
or more endoglucanase enzymes comprising an enzyme
capable of catalyzing the hydrolysis of 1, 4–â–D–glycosidic
linkages in cellulose, the one or more endoglucanase
enzymes being present in a weight ratio to the unhydrolyzed
soy fiber of about 1:1,000 to about 1:25;
(f) mixing under high speed for about 60 minutes to about
120 minutes to hydrolyze between about 0.5% and about 5%
of the glycosidic bonds present in the unhydrolyzed soy
fiber;
(g) inactivating the one or more endoglucanase enzymes;
and
(h) drying the resulting enzymatic hydrolysate by spray
drying; to provide a hydrolysate of soy fiber having an
average degree of hydrolysis of between about 0.5% and
9. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
10. Patent “claims” are the numbered paragraphs at the end of the patent, each of
which defines a separate invention that the patent-holder holds exclusive rights to make and
use. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
11. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is the Federal court of appeals
that has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
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about 5%; a water holding capacity which is reduced by
about 10% to about 35% as compared to the water holding
capacity of the unhydrolyzed soy fiber; a free simple sugar
content of less than about 1%; and which is suitable for
human consumption.12
The patent claim in the second case, from the field of computer
science, reads as follows:
A transceiver for transmitting a first stream of data symbols, the
transceiver comprising:
a converter for converting the first stream of data symbols
into plural sets of N data symbols each;
first computing means for operating on the plural sets of N
data symbols to produce modulated data symbols
corresponding to an invertible randomized spreading of the
first stream of data symbols; and
means to combine the modulated data symbols for
transmission.13
The first (biotechnology) claim asks the reader to grapple with an
eight-step method that includes such technical concepts as enzymatic
hydrolysate, hydrated unhydrolyzed soy fiber, endoglucanase and
exohydrolytic enzymes, and 1, 4–â–D–glycosidic linkages. The second
(computer science) claim is almost simple by comparison, yet it still asks
the reader to grapple with “modulated data symbols corresponding to an
invertible randomized spreading of the first stream of data symbols.” Both
claims include concepts that would be virtually impenetrable to readers
who lack knowledge of life science or computer science, respectively.
Indeed, patents are designed for people who do have grounding in the
technological field of the patent. These people are known as “persons
skilled in the art,” “persons of ordinary skill in the art,” or simply “skilled
artisans.”14 Their presence in patent law is nearly ubiquitous. For example,
patent claims are preceded by a specification or “written description of the
invention,” which must contain “such full, clear, concise, and exact terms
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains” to make or

12. In re Urbanski, 809 F.3d 1237, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
13. Wi-Lan, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 811 F.3d 455, 459 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
14. This Article will use these terms interchangeably, consistent with the case law.
See, e.g., In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (using “person having ordinary
skill in the art” and “skilled artisan” interchangeably); In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1358
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (using “those skilled in the art” and “one of ordinary skill in the art”
interchangeably); Janssen Pharm., Inc. v. Watson Labs., Inc., No. CIV.A. 08-5103 SRC,
2012 WL 3990221, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 11, 2012) (“‘skilled artisan’ is shorthand for ‘a
person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.’”).
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use the invention.15 Likewise, “[t]he words used in the claims must be
considered in context and are examined through the viewing glass of a
person skilled in the art.”16 Moreover, in deciding whether a patent is
invalid for being a merely obvious advance over prior inventions, the
proper inquiry is whether “the claimed invention as a whole would have
been obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the
claimed invention pertains.”17
Thus, patent jurors are often called upon to place themselves in the
shoes of a person skilled in the art, and use that vantage point to decide
various issues in patent cases. For example, jurors are often instructed that
any claim terms that were not specifically construed by the court are to be
given whatever ordinary and accustomed meaning they would have to a
person of skill in the art.18 Jurors also may be called upon to decide
whether the patent is invalid for lack of enablement, which turns on
whether the specification would enable a person of ordinary skill in the art
to make and use the invention.19 Also, as alluded to above, jurors decide
whether a patent is invalid for obviousness by asking whether it would
have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art.20
15. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
16. Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls, Div. of Dover Res., Inc. v. Mega Sys., LLC,
350 F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
18. See, e.g., GPNE Corp. v. Apple Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 839, 861 n. 11 (N.D. Cal.
2015); Internet Machines LLC v. Alienware Corp., No. 6:10-CV-23, 2013 WL 4056282, at
*13 (E.D. Tex. June 19, 2013) (“the Court instructed the jury that it had interpreted the
claim language and that any language not interpreted should be given its ordinary meaning
as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.”); Saffran v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 2:07CV-451 TJW, 2011 WL 1299607, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2011) (“Because the phrase
was not construed, the jury was charged to give the words their plain and ordinary meaning
as understood by one with ordinary skill in the art.”)
19. See, e.g., Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209, 1224 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (“In order to enable the claims of a patent pursuant to § 112, the patent specification
must teach those of ordinary skill in the art ‘how to make and use the full scope of the
claimed invention without undue experimentation.’ . . . Here, because the underlying inquiry
was inherently factual, we look to whether a reasonable jury could have made the
underlying factual findings necessary to provide substantial evidence in support of its
[enablement] conclusion.”); Multimedia Patent Trust v. Apple Inc., No. 10-CV-2618-H
KSC, 2012 WL 6863471, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2012) (“Summary judgment on the issue
of enablement is inappropriate because there remains a genuine dispute of material fact for
the jury as to whether the disclosures of the ’878 Patent teach a person of ordinary skill in
the art how to decode a non-interlaced field.”).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 103. Technically, obviousness is a mixed question of law and fact, but
jurors often decide factual questions bearing on obviousness, and these questions are often
tied to the hypothetical person of skill in the art. For example, a jury may be asked to
determine whether a person of skill in the art would have been motivated to modify the prior
art to create the claimed invention. See, e.g., Duro-Last, Inc. v. Custom Seal, Inc. 321 F.3d
1098, 1108-09 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (discussing whether it is obvious to use a butt weld instead
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The list goes on. For example, juries may find that an accused product
infringes a patent under the “doctrine of equivalents.”21 To decide
doctrine-of-equivalents infringement, a jury must decide whether the
differences between the accused product and the claim “are ‘insubstantial’
to one of ordinary skill in the art.”22 On the other side of the ledger, juries
may find that a single prior art reference teaches every element of a patent
claim and thus renders the claim invalid for “anticipation.” “Invalidation
on this ground requires that every element and limitation of the claim was
previously described in a single prior art reference, either expressly or
inherently, so as to place a person of ordinary skill in possession of the
invention.”23
But there is no good reason to think that lay jurors are able to
successfully place themselves in the shoes of a skilled artisan, or to view all
the aforementioned issues through a skilled artisan’s eyes. In high-tech
patent cases, a person of ordinary skill in the art is usually deemed to have
a bachelor’s degree in the field of the patent, sometimes accompanied by
one or more years of experience in that field.24 A lay juror without those
qualifications will naturally find it difficult, if not impossible, to place
himself in the shoes of a hypothetical person with those qualifications.
of a lap weld in a certain context). In addition, juries are often asked to decide the
“ultimate” obviousness question of whether a skilled artisan would have found the claims
obvious. However, this ultimate question is deemed a question of law, so a jury’s resolution
of it will be given no deference on appeal. See Rothman v. Target Corp., 556 F.3d 1310,
1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[t]his court reviews [the] jury’s conclusions on obviousness, a
question of law, without deference, and the underlying findings of fact, whether explicit or
implicit within the verdict, for substantial evidence.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997).
22. Overhead Door Corp. v. Chamberlain Grp., Inc., 194 F.3d 1261, 1269 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
23. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
24. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The
district court first found that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have a bachelor’s
degree in pharmaceutical science or analytical chemistry, and some experience in drugs and
drug preparation.”); Emerson Elec. Co. v. Suzhou Cleva Elec. Appliance Co., No. 4:13-CV1043-SPM, 2015 WL 5768572, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 30, 2015) (“[T]he parties do not
dispute that one of ordinary skill in the art is someone with a bachelor’s degree in
mechanical engineering or equivalent technical experience.”); Blue Spike, LLC v. Texas
Instruments, Inc., No. 6:12-CV-499-MHS-CMC, 2014 WL 5299320, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Oct.
16, 2014) (“the Court finds that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have at least a
Bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering, computer science, or equivalent degree, with a
background and at least two years’ experience in signal processing, image processing,
biometric identification, or a related field.”); Nano-Second Tech. Co. v. Dynaflex Int’l, 944
F. Supp. 2d 855, 861 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“one of ordinary skill in the art would have a good
understanding of electronics hardware and mechanical design. Such person will have a
Bachelor’s degree from a four-year college in Electrical Engineering, Electronics, and
Mechanical Engineering, and a year of relevant experience.”).
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How could a lay juror with no computer science background be able to
appreciate the knowledge and critical thinking skills that a computer
science bachelor’s degree would impart? How could this lay juror truly
place himself in the shoes of a computer science degree-holder? Asking
lay jurors to view patent-law issues through the eyes of a skilled artisan
comes close to an impossible exercise in metaphysics.
The sources of proof in high-tech patent cases are similarly beyond the
ken of most lay jurors. Computer science patent cases often involve
parsing the source code of the accused product and matching the source
code against the patent claims to determine infringement.25 Biotechnology
patent cases often involve using complex imaging techniques, such as Xray diffraction or nuclear magnetic resonance, to compare the structure of
the accused compound against the patent claims.26 There is no reason to
think that lay jurors are remotely competent to analyze source code, X-ray
diffraction patterns, or other highly technical sources of proof.
To be sure, it is nearly universal for patent litigants to come to trial
with paid technical experts, who are often professors or other academics in
the field of the patent.27 In theory, these experts are supposed to explain
complex technologies to lay jurors and phrase these technologies in terms
that the jurors can understand.28 But this creates its own set of problems.
Each expert will naturally say that the evidence supports his or her client’s
position, and a lay juror who has no way of independently evaluating the
evidence may have no choice but to simply believe one expert over the
other. This creates a likelihood that jurors might defer to whichever expert
comes across as more likeable or learned, without regard to the technical
merit of what the expert is saying (which the jurors are ill-equipped to
evaluate in any event).
As former law professor and current Federal Circuit judge Kimberly
Moore pointed out: “If juries are unable to understand the technology or
25. For this reason, source code is the first item in many districts’ lists of items that
must be produced at an early stage of a patent case. See, e.g., E.D. Tex. Local Patent Rule
3-4(a); N.D. Cal. Local Patent Rule 3-4(a) (stating that party opposing a claim of patent
infringement must produce source code or other documentation).
26. See, e.g., Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1423 (Fed.
Cir. 1994) (“In order to establish its case, Bristol had to show that the accused compound
infringed the claim contained in the patent. This required Bristol to show that the diffraction
pattern of cefadroxil DC following its conversion in vivo displayed the same diffraction
pattern as that of the claimed compound.”)
27. See Edward J. Poplawski, Selection and Use of Experts in Patent Cases, 9 FED.
CIR. B.J. 145 (1999) (“It is axiomatic that technical experts are virtually a sine qua non for
patent litigation”).
28. See id. (“Technical experts generally perform one or more of the following
functions: . . . (4) educate the court and the jury as to the underlying technology; and (5)
testify as to a broad range of patent issues. . . .”).
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apply the law, their decisions will be based on less meritorious influences
such as bias, likeability, or emotion.”29 “In short, the less a jury
understands about the technology, the more likely unrelated issues will
influence decisionmaking.”30 On that note, there is no shortage of
tangential issues that skilled patent litigators can raise to try to sway juries
towards their clients and against their adversaries. For example, small
patentees suing large technology companies may raise the “David vs.
Goliath” theme and cast themselves as a scrappy underdog heroically
fighting against a giant corporation.31 Conversely, successful companies
sued by small non-practicing patentees may characterize their adversaries
as “trolls” who do not make products but use their patents merely to extort
money from others.32 Furthermore, both patentees and defendants
commonly begin their trial presentations with testimony from fresh-faced
corporate representatives — individuals who might have nothing to say
about the merits of the infringement case — who are put on the witness
stand simply to humanize the company they serve in front of the jury.33 All
these tactics can be highly effective on lay jurors who cannot adequately
evaluate the technical merits of the case and who may therefore seek
alternative bases for their verdict.
In sum, lay jurors are ill-equipped to competently decide high-tech
patent cases. They will likely find it impossible to put themselves in the
shoes of a skilled artisan, though they are routinely called upon to do just
that. They have little ability to independently evaluate the technical
evidence in high-tech patent cases. And their failure to understand the
technical issues in such cases leaves them acutely vulnerable to “less
meritorious influences such as bias, likeability, or emotion.”34
29. Kimberly A. Moore, Jury Demands: Who’s Asking?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 847,
852 (2002).
30. Id. at 852 n. 15.
31. See Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and
Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1571 (2009)
(“While each patent dispute is unique, most fit the profile of one of a limited number of
patent litigation stories. A dispute between an independent inventor and a large company,
for instance, is often cast in ‘David v. Goliath’ terms.”).
32. See id. (“Patent licensing and enforcement entities who sue have been labeled
‘trolls.’”).
33. Indeed, courts often deny motions in limine brought to exclude such background
information about the parties. See, e.g., Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., No. 13-CV03999-BLF, 2015 WL 4129193, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2015) (ruling that “both parties
have a right to introduce their respective companies to the jury and to provide factual
background information concerning the companies.”); Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC
v. Zynga, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-00068-JRG, 2013 WL 10253110, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 30,
2013) (denying motion in limine “as to the parties’ ability to provide general background
information on their business.”).
34. Moore, supra note 29.
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B. How Specialized Patent Juries Could Improve the Adjudicatory
Process
Based on the foregoing points, it seems self-evident that patent trials
could be greatly improved by impaneling specialized juries, comprised of
individuals whose knowledge and experience roughly tracks that of the
hypothetical skilled artisan. Members of such specialized juries would be
far better suited to put themselves in the shoes of a skilled artisan than lay
jurors because they would (more or less) be skilled artisans. For example,
if a skilled artisan for a given patent case were deemed to have a bachelor’s
degree in computer science, then who better to decide the case than
specialized jurors with that very credential? Such specialized jurors could
read the patent the way a skilled artisan would, apply the knowledge of a
skilled artisan when deciding whether the patent is obvious, and likewise
apply the knowledge of a skilled artisan in deciding whether features of the
accused product are equivalent to features in the patent claims.
By the same token, such specialized jurors would be far better suited
than lay jurors to comprehend the sources of proof that are commonly used
in high-tech patent cases. Someone with a bachelor’s degree in computer
science, for example, would likely be able to read and understand the
source code that may be introduced in a computer science patent trial.
Someone with a bachelor’s degree in biology or biochemistry would likely
have familiarity with X-ray diffraction, nuclear magnetic resonance, and
other common techniques for showing the structure of organic molecules.
In sum, specialized jurors would be far less likely than lay jurors to be “lost
at sea” when complex scientific evidence is introduced at trial.
In addition, because specialized jurors would better understand the
subject matter of a high-tech patent suit, they would be relatively resistant
to persuasion by “less meritorious influences such as bias, likeability, or
emotion.”35 Indeed, patent litigators might be less likely to even employ
emotional themes — such as the “troll” or the “David vs. Goliath” themes
discussed above — if their audiences were a group of technical specialists
instead of a group of lay jurors. Consider how patent litigation currently
plays out in the International Trade Commission, or ITC. The ITC is a
Federal administrative body that can block the importation of goods that
are found to infringe a U.S. patent.36 Unlike district court patent trials, ITC
trials contain no juries. Instead, ITC trials are decided by Administrative
Law Judges (ALJs) who frequently have technical (i.e., scientific)
35. Id.
36. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B), (d)(1) (granting the ITC authority to investigate
unfair practices in import trade and exclude illegal articles from entry into the United
States).
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backgrounds.37 In this author’s experience, ITC trials are far less likely
than jury trials to feature emotionally charged arguments or themes.
Indeed, many ITC judges choose not to hear closing arguments at all,38
which is the most common point of the proceeding where trial lawyers
deploy their most heated emotional rhetoric.39 If specialized juries replaced
lay juries in patent trials, one might expect the tenor of these trials to move
closer to dry, technical ITC proceedings and move further away from
theatrical, emotional proceedings. This would be a decidedly good thing,
as jurors should decide patent cases on the technical merits rather than their
gut judgments about which party, witness, or lawyer is more emotionally
appealing.
Specialized juries could also provide other, less-obvious benefits, and
offer intriguing new possibilities to improve patent litigation. Consider, for
example, jury verdict forms. Currently, verdict forms in patent cases are
“black box” forms where the jury checks off whether it found the patent
infringed or invalid, but provides no written explanation for why it reached
its decision or what evidence it used to support that decision.40 The
Supreme Court, Federal Circuit, and legal commentators have all noted the
concern that these “black box” verdicts impede appellate review by
preventing the reviewing court from understanding the reasoning behind
the jury’s decision.41
37. See Jacqueline Lee, Is the U.S. International Trade Commission Protectionist? A
Comparative Study of Border Enforcement Measures, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 593, 617 (2012) (“The
ITC is known for its expertise in regard to patent infringement actions for two general
reasons: one, the vast majority of cases heard by the ALJs at the ITC involve the
infringement of patent rights; and two, many ALJs and Commissioners have technical
backgrounds.”); Note, Recasting the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Role in the
Patent System, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2337, 2352 (2013) (“The ITC is much faster than either
the district courts or the PTO; in addition, its expert ALJs are both technical experts on par
with PTO administrative patent judges (and much better than lay district judges or
juries) . . .”).
38. See, e.g., Inv. No. 337-TA-800, Order No. 2, at § 10.2 (Aug. 31, 2011) (setting
forth ALJ Theodore Essex’s usual practice of not hearing closing arguments); Inv. No. 337TA-666, Order No. 2, at § 10.2 (Jan. 14, 2009) (same with ALJ James Gildea).
39. See James H. Roberts, Jr., The SEC of Closing Arguments, 23 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
203, 206 (1999) (“Emotion is a powerful element in effective closing arguments. . . . [O]ne
can conclude that jurors make the critical decisions charged to them by the court on an
emotional basis. Therefore, when lawyers plan their closing arguments, lawyers must
consider emotion, especially in developing the story of the case and in delivering the
story.”).
40. See, e.g., McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(“Due to the ‘black box’ nature of the jury’s verdict, it is impossible to determine which of
the above pieces of evidence, alone or in combination, carried the day in the jury room, and
how much weight was assigned to each piece.”).
41. See, e.g., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39 n.8
(1997) (noting “the concern over unreviewability due to black-box jury verdicts”);
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But if lay jurors were replaced with specialized jurors who hold at
least a bachelor’s degree in the field of the patent, it might become feasible
to ask the jury to provide written explanations for its decision, somewhat
akin to the written finding of fact that district judges provide in bench
trials42 or the written findings of fact that ALJ’s provide in ITC
proceedings.43 The jury might be provided with a laptop computer in the
jury room, and asked to collectively draft a short statement explaining the
basis for their verdict. Even a two-to-three page statement — the kind of
thing a group of college graduates might be able to draft in a few hours or
less — would be much more illuminating than the impenetrable “black
box” verdict forms that reviewing courts currently face. These specialized
jurors should be competent to give a written explanation of why they
reached their verdict, since persons with at least a bachelor’s degree in the
field of the patent surely have experience writing in that field.44
II.

SPECIALIZED PATENT JURIES WOULD BE CONSTITUTIONAL

Of course, no matter how much specialized juries might improve the
adjudication of patent cases, they could not be seriously promoted if their
existence would be unconstitutional. There are at least two constitutional
objections that one might plausibly raise against specialized patent juries.
First, one might argue that specialized juries would violate patent litigants’
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Second, one might argue that the
exclusion of laypersons from specialized juries would violate those
laypersons’ Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. However, as
discussed in subparts (A) and (B) below, specialized juries are actually
consistent with both of these constitutional guarantees.
A. The Seventh Amendment
The Seventh Amendment provides that, “[i]n suits at common law,
Structural Rubber Products Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 718 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(“Concerns have been expressed by the patent bar that a jury trial creates a black box into
which patents are thrown and emerge intact or invalid by an unknown and unknowable
process”); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-an Empirical Peek Inside
the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 368 (2000) (“The ‘black box’ nature of jury verdicts
leaves the Federal Circuit unable to correct inaccuracy or bias on the part of jurors.”).
42. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1) (providing that the court must find and state the facts
in actions tried without a jury).
43. See 19 CFR § 207.114(b)(1) (providing that the ITC must include findings of fact
in its initial determination).
44. Indeed, under this Article’s proposal to offer jury commissions to speciallyselected individuals who have a technical degree (see Part IV, infra), the government might
also select for individuals who have demonstrated proficiency in clear expository writing.
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where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved . . . .”45 The Supreme Court has held that the
“[t]he right of trial by jury thus preserved [by the Seventh Amendment] is
the right which existed under the English common law when the
amendment was adopted.”46 Thus, in determining whether a given practice
or procedure violates the Seventh Amendment, the Supreme Court looks
first and foremost to the established English practices that existed as of
1791, when the Seventh Amendment was adopted.47
Under this historical analysis, there are strong grounds to conclude
that the Seventh Amendment allows civil suits to be tried before
specialized jurors who have familiarity with the general subject matter of
the suit. In fact, specialized juries were well established in English
practice, from the Middle Ages up through the time of the Seventh
Amendment’s adoption.48
Some early English examples show the specialized jury concept being
carried out to almost parodic lengths. For example, a jury of “cooks and
fishmongers” presided over the trial of a defendant accused of selling bad
food, a jury of matrons was impaneled to decide a pregnancy-related claim,
and a jury of booksellers and printers was impaneled to decide a libel
trial.49 Moreover, the English practice of using specialized juries became
only more established in the decades leading up to the enactment of the
Seventh Amendment. In 1730, for example, Parliament formally codified
the specialized jury by passing a law that allowed any litigant to request
45. U.S. CONST., AMENDMENT VII.
46. Balt. & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935).
47. See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 348-49
(1998) (applying historical English practice to determine whether statutory copyright
damages claim must be tried to a jury under the Seventh Amendment); Granfinanciera, S.A.
v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 43 (1989) (applying historical English practice to determine
whether fraudulent conveyance claim brought by bankruptcy trustee carries Seventh
Amendment right to jury trial); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 & 482 (1935)
(applying historical English practice to determine whether additur by trial judge violated
Seventh Amendment).
48. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 2, at 7 (“In the second half of the seventeenth century, it
was not uncommon for a jury to include only property owners or experts in the subject
matter of the litigation”); White, supra note 2, at 787 (“The use of expert juries is rooted in
English common law. Originally, juries in England were often selected for their special
knowledge of the issues at trial.”); see also The Case for Special Juries in Complex Civil
Litigation, 89 YALE L.J. 1155, 1163 (1980) (“Special juries are in fact part of a long
historical tradition in England. Juries of particularly qualified persons have been in use
since the middle ages to decide cases that might be outside the experience of ordinary
jurors.”).
49. Kristy Lee Bertelsen, From Specialized Courts to Specialized Juries: Calling for
Professional Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 3 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1, 1011 (1998).

2016]

SPECIALIZED JURIES FOR PATENT CASES

1189

such a jury.50 The specialized jury then reached its apotheosis after 1756,
when the famous British jurist Lord Mansfield ascended to Chief Justice of
the King’s Bench and began to routinely impanel specialized juries of
merchants to decide important mercantile cases.51 Given the transformative
effect that Lord Mansfield’s cases had on mercantile law — he is often
called “the father of modern mercantile law”52 — his special merchant
juries would have been well known on both sides of the Atlantic. If the
Seventh Amendment right to jury trial was truly meant to track 18th-century
English practice, then there could be no better or more prominent example
of that English practice than Lord Mansfield’s merchant juries. Thus, the
relevant English practice strongly supports the argument that specialized
juries are consistent with the Seventh Amendment.
Furthermore, many American state court systems have historically
provided for specialized juries,53 and a few continue to this day.54 Although
50. An Act for the Better Regulation of Juries, 3 Geo. 2, c. 25 (1730) (Eng.). See also
William V. Luneburg & Mark A. Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert
Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil
Litigation, 67 VA. L. REV. 887, 903 (1981) (“In 1730, Parliament underscored the
legitimacy of the special jury when it passed a statute that declared the right of any litigant,
in either a civil or criminal case, to move for a special jury.”).
51. See Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 50, at 903 (“The most extensive use of
special juries came in the second half of the century, however, when Lord Mansfield began
to use a trained corps of merchants regularly as jurors in commercial cases. This practice
developed during his term as Chief Justice of the King’s Bench from 1756 until 1788, and
apparently was continued for some time thereafter.”); James C. Oldham, The Origins of the
Special Jury, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 137, 164 (1983) (“During the late eighteenth century, for
example, special juries of merchants well-versed in mercantile customs helped Lord
Mansfield articulate and order principles of commercial law.”); Lochlan F. Shelfer, Special
Juries in the Supreme Court, 123 YALE L.J. 208, 214 (2013) (“Although the practice of
special juries in general, and special juries of merchants in particular, originated in the
medieval period, Lord Mansfield brought special juries of merchants into widespread use
upon his appointment as Chief Justice of King’s Bench in 1756. Under Mansfield, special
juries of merchants became prevalent throughout England and the colonies in the late
eighteenth century.”).
52. John Morey Maurice, A New Personal Limited Liability Shield for General
Partners: But Not All Partners Are Treated the Same, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 369, 376 (2008)
(“During his thirty-two year career as a judge, Lord Mansfield became known in England as
the ‘father of modern mercantile law.’”).
53. See Laura G. Dooley, National Juries for National Cases: Preserving Citizen
Participation in Large-Scale Litigation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 411, 438-39 (2008) (“More than
half of American states had statutes authorizing the use of special juries during the first half
of the twentieth century . . . .”); Shaw, supra note 2, at 26 (“Seventeen states have used
some form of a specialized jury, basing their authority primarily on state statutes.”); White,
supra note 2, at 787-88 (“In the United States, expert juries were provided for by statute in
many states by the first part of the twentieth century.”).
54. See, e.g., 10 Del. C. § 4506 (allowing for special juries in “complex civil case[s]”);
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37-23-104 (providing that certain water drainage cases be heard
before individuals “who have some knowledge of the costs and benefits of farm drainage
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states are not bound by the Seventh Amendment,55 many of the states that
provided specialized juries also have state constitutional provisions
comparable to the Seventh Amendment — provisions that “preserved
inviolate the right of trial by jury.”56 The fact that these states enacted
specialized juries alongside their constitutional jury-trial protections
strongly suggests that the traditional American understanding of “trial by
jury” does not preclude specialized juries.
In sum, the historical English practice — the lodestar for Seventh
Amendment jurisprudence — indicates that specialized juries are consistent
with the Seventh Amendment, and state practice further suggests that
specialized juries are consistent with American jury trial rights. Thus,
impaneling specialized juries of skilled artisans for patent cases appears not
to violate the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.
B. The Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o state
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”57 While the Fourteenth Amendment does not directly apply
against the Federal government (and therefore could not be directly
invoked to invalidate a Federal specialized jury system), the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection guarantee is incorporated against the
Federal government through the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause.58
Thus, “the Fifth Amendment imposes on the Federal Government the same
standard required of state legislation by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”59
That being the case, would it violate equal protection for the Federal
government to impanel specialized patent juries consisting of individuals
who are skilled in the field of the patent? Would this violate the equal
protection rights of all other individuals, who would not be eligible to serve
on these specialized juries?
and shall be sworn as a special jury to try the case . . . .”).
55. Before the 20th century, the Bill of Rights (including, of course, the Seventh
Amendment) was deemed wholly inapplicable to the states. Barron v. Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
243 (1833). In the 20th century, the Supreme Court “incorporated” most Bill of Rights
protections to apply to the states, but the Seventh Amendment has never been so
incorporated. See, e.g., GTFM, LLC v. TKN Sales, Inc., 257 F.3d 235, 245 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“[T]he Seventh Amendment, though guaranteeing the right to a jury trial for legal issues in
cases tried in federal courts, does not apply to the States.”).
56. Luneburg & Nordenberg, supra note 50, at 903.
57. U.S. CONST., AMENDMENT XIV, § 1.
58. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (noting that equal protection and due
process are not mutually exclusive, and that discrimination may violate both clauses).
59. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 226 n.6 (1981).
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The answer is most likely “no.” As an initial matter, “the Supreme
Court has not recognized a Constitutional mandate that jury pools in civil
cases reflect a fair cross-section of the community.”60 And even in the
criminal context where the lion’s share of jury-representation cases has
arisen, successful equal protection challenges have generally been limited
to the exclusion of discrete racial, gender, or ethnic groups. As the
Supreme Court explained in Lockhart v. McCree:
Our prior jury-representativeness cases, whether based on the
fair-cross-section component of the Sixth Amendment61 or the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, have
involved such groups as blacks, women, and MexicanAmericans . . . . Because these groups were excluded for reasons
completely unrelated to the ability of members of the group to
serve as jurors in a particular case, the exclusion raised at least
the possibility that the composition of juries would be arbitrarily
skewed . . . In addition, the exclusion from jury service of large
groups of individuals not on the basis of their inability to serve as
jurors, but on the basis of some immutable characteristic such as
race, gender, or ethnic background, undeniably gave rise to an
“appearance of unfairness.”62
Limiting patent juries to those skilled in the relevant art would not
raise any of those concerns. While laypersons would be excluded from
specialized juries, their exclusion would not be “unrelated to the ability of
members of the group to serve as jurors in a particular case.”63 To the
contrary, their exclusion would be closely related to their ability to serve,
as it would be based on the logical point that those skilled in the field of a
given patent are best suited to decide a lawsuit over such a patent.64 By
analogy, Lockhart held that limiting a capital-case jury pool to those who
were philosophically willing to apply the death penalty was constitutional,
because this limitation “is carefully designed to serve the State’s
concededly legitimate interest in obtaining a single jury that can properly
and impartially apply the law to the facts of the case at both the guilt and
sentencing phases of a capital trial.”65 The same could be said about
limiting patent juries to those skilled in the art: this limitation would be
“carefully designed to serve the [government’s] concededly legitimate
interest in obtaining a single jury that can properly and impartially apply
60. Fleming v. Chi. Transit Auth., 397 F. App’x 249, 249 (7th Cir. 2010).
61. The Sixth Amendment is what grants the constitutional right to jury trial in
criminal cases. U.S. CONST., AMENDMENT VI.
62. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175 (1986) (internal citations omitted).
63. Id.
64. See supra Part II(B).
65. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 175-176.
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the law to the facts of the case.”
One might draw another analogy to governmental licensing laws that
restrict who may enter a given profession. When these laws are challenged
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause, they will be
upheld as long as they are rationally related to the demands of the
profession.66 This is a highly deferential test; courts “need only determine
whether the licensing scheme has a ‘conceivable basis’ on which it might
survive rational basis scrutiny.”67
Limiting patent juries to skilled artisans would essentially impose a
licensing requirement, as only skilled artisans would be “licensed” to serve
on such juries. Yet it is hard to imagine that this limitation would fail
rational basis review. As discussed in Part I(B) above, there are numerous
rational reasons why skilled artisans would be more competent to decide
patent cases than lay jurors. Thus, applying the licensing analogy, limiting
patent juries to skilled artisans would seem to pass constitutional muster
under the equal protection clause.
One might nonetheless object that some groups of skilled artisans are
heavily skewed against certain racial and gender groups — groups that are
at or near the core of Fourteenth Amendment protections.68 For example,
in 2013 only 5% of professional scientists and engineers were AfricanAmerican and only 30% were women69 — far below these groups’ overall
representation in the population. In some fields the disparities are even
starker; for example, only 2.9% of life scientists were African-American in
2013, and only 25.4% of computer and math scientists were women.70
Thus, establishing specialized patent juries of skilled artisans might result
in jury pools that are heavily skewed against certain racial or gender
66. See Stephen A. Meli, Do You Have A License to Say That? Occupational Licensing
and Internet Speech, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 753, 757 (2014) (“The Supreme Court
scrutinizes challenges to government licensing schemes under the rational basis test. The
Supreme Court has held that occupational licensing laws are constitutional so long as the
qualifications ‘have a rational connection with the applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice’
his profession.”) (quoting Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of State of N.M, 353 U.S. 232,
239 (1957)).
67. Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228
F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2000).
68. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(“Legislative classifications based on gender also call for a heightened standard of review”
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S.
385, 391 (1969) (“the core of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of meaningful
and unjustified official distinctions based on race . . . .”).
69. National Center for Science Engineering Statistics, Women, Minorities, and
Persons with Disabilities in Science and Engineering: Overall Trends, NAT’L SCI. FOUND.
(2013),
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2015/nsf15311/digest/theme5.cfm#trends
[https://perma.cc/GB7Z-PER2].
70. Id. (“Blacks” and “Women” tabs).
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groups. Would this be unconstitutional under the equal protection clause?
It might at least be unsettling. All else being equal, one would not
want any classes of lawsuits to be decided by jury pools that are skewed
against certain races or genders. And Part III(C) of this Article offers
concrete suggestions for ways to reduce racial and gender disparities in
specialized patent jury pools. But even if it were impossible to completely
eliminate such disparities, this would not mean that specialized patent
juries would violate the equal protection clause. To the contrary, a facially
neutral law that is not intended to discriminate against a protected class
does not violate equal protection just because it has a disparate impact on a
protected class.71 A law establishing specialized patent juries would be just
that sort of law. While potential racial or gender disparities among
specialized patent juries would be something to recognize and address
wherever possible, such disparities would not render these juries
unconstitutional under the equal protection clause.
III.

A CONCRETE PROPOSAL FOR IMPANELING SPECIALIZED JURIES
IN PATENT CASES

Having established that specialized patent juries would be both
beneficial and constitutional, the next step is to decide whether they are
logistically feasible. As noted above, several commentators have expressed
skepticism about whether it would be feasible to impanel specialized juries
of skilled artisans for patent cases.72 To address such concerns, this Article
gives a concrete proposal for how to impanel such juries and then presents
survey data suggesting that this proposal would be feasible.
A. The Proposal: Offering Skilled Artisans One-Year Jury Terms for
a Competitive Salary
The essence of this Article’s proposal is for the Federal government to
offer one-year jury commissions to individuals who hold at least a
bachelor’s degree in the fields that spawn the most technically complex
patent cases, such as computer science, electrical engineering, and the life
sciences.73 These jurors would be paid a significant salary, on the order of
71. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“we have not held that a law,
neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion
of one race than of another.”).
72. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (explaining certain commentators’
skepticism over the ability to find enough qualified jurors).
73. See supra note 7 (explaining how many if not most complex patent cases implicate
computer science, electrical engineering, and/or the life sciences).
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$100,000 for their one-year term of service. To aid in recruiting a critical
mass of jurors, the specialized jury pools would be established in the 10-12
judicial districts that have the highest concentration of technology jobs
and/or research institutions. These districts most likely include the places
such specialized jurors are already living or would be most willing to live.
The patent venue statute74 could be amended to require that patent lawsuits
be brought in one of those districts (a proposal that would have a similar
effect as the venue-reform bills that are currently pending in Congress).75
Alternatively, district judges handling patent cases could make a
preliminary assessment of whether the patent-in-suit implicates complex
technology, and they could transfer the case to one of the aforementioned
judicial districts if the judge determined that the patented technology is
complex enough to warrant a specialized jury.76
Each complex patent case would be tried before a panel of jurors who
hold a bachelor’s degree, at least, in the broad technological field of the
patent. Computer science patent cases would be tried before individuals
who hold a degree in computer science; biotech patent cases would be tried
before individuals who hold a degree in the life sciences; etc. As noted
above, a bachelor’s degree in the field of the patent — sometimes
accompanied by one or more years’ experience — generally equals the
level of ordinary skill in the art for most high-tech patent cases.77 Thus, by
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
75. For example, the proposed Innovation Act would generally restrict patent venue to
judicial districts where either: (1) the patent’s named inventor conducted research and
development; (2) the patent-owner developed a product practicing the patent; or (3) the
defendant has a regular and established physical facility giving rise to the infringement. As
a practical matter, this Act would funnel most patent suits into the districts with a large
number of research institutions and/or technology companies — the same districts that
would be attractive places for specialized patent jurors to live. Innovation Act, H.R. 9,
114th Cong. § 3(281B)(b) (2015).
76. Judges already have broad discretionary power to transfer civil cases to other
districts “for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interests of justice.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a). Transferring a complex patent case to a district that could better decide the case
through a specialized jury would seem to satisfy at least the “interests of justice” prong of
Section 1404(a). This would likely be enough to warrant transfer under Section 1404(a),
unless the transferee district was markedly inconvenient for the parties and witnesses. See
Moses v. Bus. Card Exp., Inc., 929 F.2d 1131, 1137 (6th Cir. 1991) (“in ruling on a motion
to transfer under § 1404(a), a district court should consider the private interests of the
parties, including their convenience and the convenience of potential witnesses, as well as
other public-interest concerns, such as systemic integrity and fairness, which come under
the rubric of ‘interests of justice.’”) (emphasis added). Moreover, given this Article’s
proposal to establish specialized jury pools in 10-12 districts nationwide, it is likely that at
least one of these 10-12 districts would be reasonably convenient for the parties and
witnesses in any given patent case.
77. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (providing cases suggesting that a person
of ordinary skill within a technical field is one with a bachelor’s degree in that field or
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having high-tech patent cases heard before specialized jurors who possess
at least a bachelor’s degree in the relevant field, this Article’s proposal
would allow these cases to be heard before jurors who possess roughly the
same level of ordinary skill in the art alluded to throughout patent law.
Likewise, by assembling a large pool of specialized jurors and retaining
them for a one-year term of service, this proposal strives to ensure that
there would be an adequate supply of skilled artisans ready and available to
hear any high-tech patent cases that come up for trial.
Under this proposal, the cost of the jurors’ salaries would be offset by
surcharges on patent litigants. The surcharges could be relatively modest;
perhaps $25,000 per party. While this sum may seem significant at first
blush, high-stakes patent cases typically cost each party $3-$5 million to
litigate through to verdict.78 Even low-stakes patent cases, where less than
$1 million is at stake, cost each party an average of $600,000 to litigate.79
Viewed in this light, requiring litigants to pay an extra $25,000 in exchange
for having their case heard before a specialized jury that is more likely to
issue an informed verdict seems quite reasonable. Indeed, many patent
litigants with strong cases would welcome this development.80
The $25,000 surcharge figure was derived as follows: patent trials
average two weeks in length,81 so a specialized juror could easily be
expected to hear 18 trials during a one-year term of service (even with a
healthy margin of error for unusually-lengthy trials or deliberation periods).
At a $100,000 annual salary, this means that each juror would cost roughly
$5,500 per trial. For panels of nine jurors (halfway between the minimum
number of six, and the maximum number of twelve jurors contemplated by

equivalent technical experience).
78. See American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) Report of the
Economic Survey (2015) at 37 (finding that the average per-party cost of patent litigation is
$3.1 million when $10-$25 million in potential damages is at stake, and that the average
cost rises to $5 million when more than $25 million is at stake.)
79. Id.
80. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 55 (“A litigant with a strong, but complex case, and
many millions of dollars riding on the outcome, would be ill-advised to simply roll the dice
rather than spending a comparatively small sum of money to dramatically increase his
chances of achieving his rightful victory.”).
81. See, e.g., John E. Kidd & Keeto H. Sabharwal, The District of Delaware: An Ideal
Venue for Patent Litigators, DEL. LAW., Winter 2000, 16, 17 (“[T]he Delaware District
Court generally limits patent trials to two weeks . . . .”); Stephen D. Susman & Thomas M.
Melsheimer, Trial by Agreement: How Trial Lawyers Hold the Key to Improving Jury Trials
in Civil Cases, 32 REV. LITIG. 431, 445 (2013) (“In the Eastern District of Texas, for
example, long known as one of the most active patent venues in the country, cases involving
complex technology and billions of dollars in alleged damages are routinely tried in two
weeks or less, and less complex patent trials are often concluded with five or six total days
of trial time.”). In this author’s experience as well, two-week patent trials are the norm.
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the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure82), the total per-trial jury cost would
be roughly $50,000. Split evenly between the plaintiff and defendant, each
party could be charged $25,000 to make up for the cost of the specialized
jurors’ salaries.
In actuality, the effective cost to the parties would be significantly less
than that, since specialized juries would impart cost savings to the parties in
the form of shortened trials. As discussed above, specialized juries would
be less susceptible to tangential, emotional arguments,83 and might even
view such arguments as an unwelcome distraction from the technical merits
of the case. As a result, savvy lawyers might omit these arguments (and
the witnesses used to support these arguments) if their patent cases were
tried before specialized juries, just as those arguments are commonly
omitted from ITC proceedings. In addition, the parties’ expert witnesses
would likewise eliminate (or greatly shorten) background tutorials on the
scientific field of the patent, since they would be speaking to an audience
with a significant level of skill and training in this field.
Furthermore, trials could be shortened even further by taking
advantage of the fact that specialized jurors under this Article’s proposal
would be repeat players in patent litigation. At the start of their terms of
service, such jurors could also be given a one-to-two day primer on patent
law. This would obviate the need for some of the more tedious features of
patent trials, such as playing the Federal Judicial Center’s introductory
video on patent litigation84 or having the trial judge orally recite lengthy
boilerplate jury instructions on infringement, invalidity, and other basic
patent law concepts.85 The patent video and boilerplate jury instructions
are designed to give lay jurors some minimal familiarity with the law that
governs their factual decision-making, but such instruction would be
superfluous if a case were tried before repeat player specialized jurors who
have already been tutored on the basics of patent law.
If these changes (i.e., minimizing tangential arguments, technical
tutorials, and patent-law tutorials) shorten patent trials by just one day, each

82. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 48(a) (“Number of Jurors: A jury must begin with at least 6 and
no more than 12 members . . .”).
83. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
84. Federal Judicial Center, The Patent Process: An Overview for Jurors, YOUTUBE
(Nov.
22,
2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ax7QHQTbKQE
[https://perma.cc/JN7X-6HDH].
85. For example, the Northern District of California’s Model Patent Jury Instructions
are 54 pages long, including lengthy boilerplate instructions on what a patent is, how it is
obtained, and the meaning of such ubiquitous patent-law concepts as infringement and
invalidity.
Model Patent Jury Instructions, N.D. CAL (July 16, 2015),
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions [https://perma.cc/ZSM2-CHZ7].
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party could save $10,000 or more in attorneys’ fees86 Notably, that figure
counts only the direct costs of a trial day; if one considers indirect costs
(such as the costs of preparing trial outlines and rehearsing trial testimony),
then the cost savings of eliminating a trial day would be even greater.
Thus, while the nominal cost of this Article’s proposal would be $25,000
per patent litigant, the actual effective cost would be far less, and it might
even approach zero.
B. Survey Data Suggests That This Proposal Would Be Feasible
Of course, the feasibility of this proposal ultimately hinges on whether
the government would be able to attract a critical mass of specialized jurors
who would be willing to serve one-year jury terms in exchange for
$100,000 salaries. As a general rule, individuals with at least a bachelor’s
degree in a scientific field have relatively bright career prospects, and
might not be willing to delay or interrupt their careers to serve a year as a
patent juror.
To test the feasibility of this Article’s proposal, I surveyed 389
undergraduate and graduate students at sixteen U.S. colleges and
universities.87 Each student was either majoring in or pursuing graduate
degrees in one of the two broad fields that spawn much complex patent
litigation: (1) computer science and electrical engineering, or (2) the life
sciences. After ascertaining their field of study, each student was asked the
following two questions:

86. In 2014, for example, the average “blended” rate for law firm partners and
associates in patent cases was roughly $300 per hour. Enterprise Legal Management Trends
Report, LEXISNEXIS COUNSELLINK 18 (2014). Assuming that a party’s trial team consisted
of five attorneys, each hour of trial would cost that party roughly $1,500. Thus, shaving just
one day from the length of patent trials could save each party $10,000 or more.
87. As stated in note 6, these colleges and universities are: Bates College, the
University of California-Berkeley, Claremont McKenna College, Colorado College, the
University of Florida, Grinnell College, the University of Idaho, the University of Illinois,
the University of Massachusetts, the University of Mississippi, the University of North
Dakota, Penn State University, Stanford University, Trinity University (Texas), Wellesley
College, and the University of Wyoming. A full description of my survey methodology is
provided at Appendix A, and a sample survey form is provided at Appendix B.
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The decision to survey both undergraduate and graduate students was
deliberate. As noted above, the level of ordinary skill in the art for most
high-tech patent cases is a bachelor’s degree in the field of the patent,
sometimes accompanied by one or more years’ experience.88 This means
that newly minted college graduates and newly minted master’s or Ph.D.
degree holders would bring complementary strengths to a specialized
patent jury. The college graduates would more precisely track the
educational attainment of a skilled artisan, yet they might fall short on work
experience even if summer internships and work during college were
considered. Masters or Ph.D. graduates would more likely possess the
requisite work experience due to their greater age, yet they might have
some difficulty going “back in time” to remember what skills and
knowledge they possessed at the time of their bachelor’s degree. Thus, a
jury consisting of both bachelor’s degree and advanced degree holders
would be desirable, as each group of jurors would complement the other in
terms of the skills and experience that a hypothetical skilled artisan would
have.
The survey results were highly encouraging for this Article’s
proposal. Of the overall survey respondents, 73.3% stated that they would
“seriously consider” a one-year term of post-graduation patent jury service
for $100,000 or less.89 The precise breakdown of survey responses can be
seen in the following bar graph, which shows the percentage of respondents
who would seriously consider a one-year term of patent jury service for
$50,000, $75,000, $100,000, more than $100,000, and not at all.

88. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (providing cases suggesting that a person
of ordinary skill within a technical field is one with a bachelor’s degree in that field or
equivalent technical experience).
89. This percentage was derived by taking the number of survey respondents who
would “seriously consider” patent jury service for $100,000, $75,000, or $50,000, and
dividing this number by the overall number of survey respondents.
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When one breaks down the survey responses by education level,
79.9% of undergraduate respondents would seriously consider postgraduation patent jury service for $100,000 or less, while 66.3% of
graduate respondents would do so. This disparity is not surprising;
advanced degree holders command a greater salary than bachelor’s degree
holders in the marketplace, and would therefore be expected to demand a
higher salary in exchange for delaying their careers by a year. Advanced
degree holders are also more likely to be supporting families, due to their
greater age, which also might cause them to demand a higher salary.
Nonetheless, the fact that over 66% of graduate students would seriously
consider post-graduation jury service under this proposal (together with
nearly 80% of undergraduates) suggests that it would be feasible to staff
patent juries with a mixture of bachelor’s degree and advanced degree
holders.
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Finally, breaking down the survey responses by area of study, 82.3%
of those studying life science would seriously consider patent jury service
for $100,000 or less, while 63.4% of those studying computer science or
electrical engineering would do so. Again, this disparity is not surprising,
given that computer scientists and electrical engineers generally earn more
in the marketplace than do life scientists.90 Nonetheless, the fact that a
strong majority of respondents in both categories would seriously consider
patent jury service under this proposal suggests that it would be feasible to
employ specialized patent juries across a broad range of scientific fields.

90. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the average salary for computer
scientists in the United States was $113,190 as of May 2014, the average salary for
electrical engineers was $95,780, and the average salary for biological scientists was
$79,200.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, MAY 2014 NATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL
EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE ESTIMATES (2014), http://www.bls.gov/oes/2014/may/oes_nat.htm
[https://perma.cc/JFY5-S5QQ].
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C. Other Considerations
The foregoing sections suggest that it would be feasible to assemble
specialized patent juries consisting of newly minted bachelor’s and
advanced degree-holders in technical fields, as a large percentage of such
individuals would be willing to serve on a specialized jury for an annual
salary ($100,000) that could be covered by modest surcharges on patent
litigants. Nonetheless, there are some other considerations that should be
taken into account to improve these proposed patent juries.
The first consideration is age. Staffing patent juries with newly
minted bachelor’s and advanced degree holders would yield a rather young
jury pool. Even newly minted Ph.Ds. are, on average, only 33 years old.91
91. Lynn O’Shaughnessy, 12 Reasons Not to Get a Ph.D., CBS MONEYWATCH (July
10,
2012),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/12-reasons-not-to-get-a-phd/
[https://perma.cc/XD64-LQ6K].
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Newly minted college graduates are obviously even younger. While there
is nothing intrinsically wrong with relatively young patent juries —
particularly if the level of ordinary skill in the art would be attained at a
relatively young age — a jury pool with virtually no middle-aged or older
individuals might present bad optics. To address this issue, it might be
desirable for the government to recruit older patent jurors from the ranks of
technology companies, in addition to younger patent jurors straight out of
college or university. While I have not surveyed technology workers to see
whether they would be willing to serve on specialized patent juries, it
stands to reason that at least some would be. Indeed, technology
companies whose products and services are heavily patented (or who
frequently face patent lawsuits) might even encourage their skilled
employees to take one-year sabbaticals as patent jurors, so that these
workers could learn about the patent system first-hand. It is quite possible
that a one-year stint as a specialized patent juror would become a valuable
credential in industries that revolve heavily around patents.
Another consideration, alluded to in Part III(B) above, is the racial
and gender composition of the proposed patent juries. Several scientific
fields have stark racial or gender disparities,92 and one might expect these
disparities to be reflected in specialized patent juries for those fields. To
combat these disparities, the government might aggressively recruit patent
jurors from under-represented groups. For example, since only 2.9% of life
scientists are African-American,93 the government might aggressively
recruit patent jurors from the life science programs at Historically Black
Colleges and Universities (HBCU’s). As another example, since only
25.4% of computer and math scientists are women,94 the government might
aggressively recruit patent jurors from the computer science and
mathematics programs at all-female colleges. Likewise, the government
could target volunteer organizations — such as the National Society of
Black Engineers95 and the Association for Women in Science96 — in an
92. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (providing statistics regarding racial
and gender composition of those in technical fields).
93. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (providing statistics).
94. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (providing statistics).
95. The National Society of Black Engineers is an organization with roughly 30,000
members whose mission is “to increase the number of culturally responsible Black
engineers who excel academically, succeed professionally and positively impact the
community.”
See
About
NSBE,
NAT’L SOC’Y OF BLACK ENG’RS,
http://www.nsbe.org/About-Us.aspx#.VqgDwGr2Zdg [https://perma.cc/PPB2-TURF] (last
visited Mar. 22, 2016) (providing information about the National Society of Black
Engineers).
96. The Association for Women in Science is an organization with roughly 20,000
members that “champions the interests of women in science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics across all disciplines and employment sectors.” See About AWIS, ASS’N FOR
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effort to assemble patent jury pools that are more representative of the
general population.
It is even possible that specialized patent juries could help ameliorate
some of the racial and gender disparities that plague certain scientific
industries. Currently, there is evidence that hiring managers in STEM
(science, technology, math, and engineering) fields are consciously or
unconsciously biased against female job applicants.97 However, if the
government successfully recruited a large cohort of female patent jurors,
and if a one-year stint as a patent juror became a valuable credential in
patent-heavy industries, then female patent jurors might use this credential
to improve their job prospects in these industries. A similar logic applies to
under-represented racial groups, who may similarly face bias when
applying for industry jobs in STEM fields.98
CONCLUSION
The current patent jury system is, if not broken, at least far from
optimal. Lay jurors are simply ill-suited to perform many of the complex
tasks that are required in deciding high-tech patent cases. But this state of
affairs is not inevitable. As this Article demonstrates, it would be feasible
(and constitutional) for the government to assemble specialized patent
juries comprised of individuals who are skilled in technical fields. These
specialized juries would bring much-needed scientific and technical
expertise to the field of complex patent litigation.

WOMEN IN SCI., http://www.awis.org/?page=AboutAWIS [https://perma.cc/42X5-VCL7]
(last visited Mar. 22, 2016) (providing information about the Association for Women in
Science).
97. See generally Ernest Reuben et al., How Stereotypes Impair Women’s Careers in
Science, 111 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 4403 (2014) (reporting results of
experiment suggesting that hiring managers are biased toward hiring males).
98. See Bonnie Marcus, The Lack of Diversity in Tech Is a Cultural Issue, FORBES
(Aug. 12, 2015) http://www.forbes.com/sites/bonniemarcus/2015/08/12/the-lack-ofdiversity-in-tech-is-a-cultural-issue/#160331523577 [https://perma.cc/42BU-C3X8] (noting
that “top universities graduate black and Hispanic computer science and computer
engineering students at twice the rate that leading technology companies hire them.”).
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY METHODOLOGY
To conduct the survey discussed in this Article, I created an online
survey form using Google Forms. (See Appendix B). I then emailed the
department chairs (or other professors) in the computer science, electrical
engineering, and biology departments at numerous U.S. colleges and
universities, asking them to distribute the survey to undergraduate and
graduate students in their departments. Professors from sixteen colleges
and universities agreed to distribute my survey.
As shown in the sample survey form below (see Appendix B), the
survey respondents were first asked to provide their undergraduate or
graduate field of study. Any respondents who did not affirmatively state
that they were pursuing a degree in computer science, electrical
engineering, or a life science were discarded. Any respondents who gave
internally contradictory answers (e.g., stating that they would not consider
patent jury service in the second question but stating that they would
consider patent jury service for $75,000 in the third question) were also
discarded. These discarded responses amounted to roughly 3% of total
responses and are not included in my reported tally of responses.
There was one exception to this rule. Namely, if a respondent stated
that they would not consider patent jury service in the second question, but
also stated that they would consider patent jury service for more than
$100,000 in the third question, I retained those responses. Roughly 1% of
respondents (5 out of 389) fell into this category. Their responses are
included in the “more than $100,000” bar of my bar graphs, though it
would have been equally accurate to include them in the “not at all” bar.
Including them in both bars, by contrast, would have resulted in doublecounting.
My rationale for retaining these responses was as follows: for
purposes of my proposal, respondents who would not consider patent jury
service at all and respondents who would only consider patent jury service
for more than $100,000 are functionally equivalent. Both groups would be
unwilling to serve as patent jurors under the terms of my proposal, given
that my proposal entails a $100,000 salary for patent jurors. Thus, for
purposes of my proposal, answering “no” to the second question and “more
than $100,000” to the third question is not actually contradictory since both
responses qualify the individual as someone who would be unwilling to
serve as a juror under my proposal. It follows that retaining these survey
responses (and including them in either the “more than $100,000” category
or the “not at all” category) does not skew my overall survey results. In
fact, discarding these responses would misleadingly skew my survey
results by eliminating certain negative data that rightfully should be
included.
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